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This paper describes our experiences in using static analysis and model checking to
nd errors in three case studies.
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1 Introduction
This paper grew out of our experiences with software model checking after
several years of using static analysis to nd errors. We initially thought that
the trade-o between the two was clear: static analysis was easy but would
mainly nd shallow bugs, while model checking would require more work but
would be strictly better | it would nd more errors, the errors would be
deeper, and the approach would be more powerful. These expectations were
often wrong.
This paper documents some of the lessons learned over the course of using
software model checking for three years and three projects. The rst two
projects used both static analysis and model checking, while the third used
only model checking but sharply re-enforced the trade-os we had previously
observed.
The rst project, described in Section 2 and 3, checked FLASH cache
coherence protocol implementation code [24]. We rst used static analysis to
nd violations of FLASH-specic rules (e.g., that messages are sent in such a
way as to prevent deadlock) [7] and then, in a follow-on work, applied model
checking [26]. One interesting feature of the model checking work was to use
static analysis to do automatic model extraction, which was more eective
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than a prior manual verication eort [31]. One startling result (for us) was
that despite the depth of model checking, it found many fewer errors than
relatively shallow static analysis (8 errors versus 34).
The second project, described in Section 4, checked the AODV proto-
col [10]. We eliminated the need to extract a model by building CMC [29],
a model checker that directly checks C implementations. We used CMC to
check three AODV implementations, and then statically analyzed them. The
results indicate a clear success for model checking. The model checker found
42 errors (roughly 1 per 300 lines of code). About half of these errors involve
protocol properties that would be diÆcult to check statically. However, in
the class of properties both methods could handle, static analysis found more
errors than model checking. Also, static analysis involved considerably less
eort: it took just a couple of hours, while our model checking eort took
approximately three weeks.
The nal project, described in Section 5, used CMC on the Linux TCP
network stack implementation. This project was clearly motivated by our
desire to test the applicability of model checking on large systems. This project
exposed several unexpected scalability issues with model checkers. Initially,
we thought that our only major hurdle would be the state explosion problem.
Instead, we spent many months and multiple iterations in just getting our rst
working environment model for the TCP implementation. Even this required
us to take an extreme approach of running the entire Linux Kernel along with
the TCP implementation in CMC. Once we had a working model, another
challenge was to decide on the right environment inputs to trigger various
protocol behaviors. Section 5 elaborates these problems and our attempted
solutions. Our model checking eort is still in progress and CMC has till date
found 4 errors in the TCP implementation.
While this paper describes drawbacks of software model checking compared
to static analysis, it should not be taken as a jeremiad against the approach.
We reside very much in the \model checking camp" and intend to continue pur-
sue research in the area. A main goal of the paper is to recount what surprised
us when we model checked reasonably large-scale software implementations.
While more seasoned minds might not have made the same misjudgments,
our discussions with other researchers have shown that our naivete was not
entirely unreasonable.
This paper is a set of case studies, rather than a broad study of static
analysis and model checking. While this limits the universality of our conclu-
sions, we believe the general trends we observe will hold, though the actual
coeÆcients observed in practice will dier.
1.1 The model checking approach
All of our case studies use traditional explicit state space model checkers [13,22].
We do no innovation in terms of the actual model checking engine, and so the
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challenges we face should roughly mirror those faced by others. We do believe
our conclusions optimistically estimate the eort needed to model check code.
A major drawback of most current model checking approaches is the need to
manually write a specication of the checked system. Both of our approaches
dispense with this step. The rst automatically extracts a slice of functionality
that is translated to the model checking language, while our second approach
eliminates extraction entirely by model checking the implementation code di-
rectly.
1.2 The static analysis approach
Static analysis described in this paper is done using MC [14]. At a high
level, our static analysis checking is based on compiler extensions (\checkers")
that are dynamically linked into the compiler and applied down a control-ow
graph representation of source code. Conceptually these extensions examine
one path at a time. I.e., they are ow sensitive, rather than using a more
traditional dataow framework that would conate information at program
joint points. Extensions can perform either intra- or inter-procedural analysis
at the discretion of the checker writer. In practice, the approach has been
eective, nding hundreds to thousands of errors in Linux, BSD, and various
commercial systems.
While we make claims about \static analysis" in general, this paper focuses
on our own static analysis approach, since it is the one we have personal
experience. The approach has several idiosyncratic features compared to other
static approaches that should be kept in mind.
First, our approach is unsound: code with errors can pass silently through
a checker. We generally optimize checkers to nd bugs, rather than demon-
strating their absence. In particular, when checkers cannot determine a needed
fact they typically do not emit a warning. In contrast, a sound approach would
conservatively emit an error report whenever it cannot prove the error can-
not occur. Unsoundness allows us to aggressively check properties beyond
the practical reach of sound tools, which would overwhelm the user with false
positives.
Second, we use relatively shallow data ow analysis rather than a deeper
simulation based approach such as in PREx [4]. While we perform a mild
amount of path sensitive analysis to prune infeasible paths [20], we do not
model the heap, do not track most variable values, and have limited aliasing
information. The ip side of this shallowness is that we do not have to build
an accurate, working models of the environment or of code we do not have. In
contrast, while the PREx tool can nd deeper errors, it requires that models
of missing functions be supplied.
4
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then the trade-o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erent as well. In a sense simulation brings
4
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static analysis closer to classic model checking, and hence share some of its
weaknesses as well as strengths.
Third, the approach tries as much as possible to avoid the need for annota-
tions, in part by using statistical analysis to infer properties to check [15] (such
as which functions must be paired, which functions can return null, etc.). The
need for annotations would dramatically increase the eort necessary to use
the tool, and to an extent diminish its advantages
There are many papers on the approach, so we elide a thorough description
here. The paper [14] gives a reasonable, though dated overview. The paper [20]
gives a more up-to-date view of the system. The tutorial in [6] has a series of
checker examples and references that the interested reader can use for a more
thorough introduction.
2 Case study: FLASH
This section gives a short summary of using both static analysis and model
checking to nd bugs in FLASH cache coherence protocol implementation
code. The next section focuses on the lessons learned from these eorts.
Readers familiar with Chou et al. [7] can skip Section 2.1 and 2.2. Readers
familiar with Lie et al. [26] can skip Section 2.1 and 2.3.
2.1 FLASH overview
The Stanford FLASH multiprocessor [24] is a scalable cache-coherent DSM
machine that implements its communication protocols in software that runs on
an embedded processor in its programmable node controller, MAGIC. While
implementing such protocols in software facilitates great exibility, it places
a serious burden on the programmer. The code executes on each cache miss,
so it must be egregiously optimized. At the same time a single bug in the
controller can deadlock or livelock the entire machine.
We checked ve protocols with static analysis and four with model check-
ing. These protocols range between 10K to 18K lines of code and have long
control ow paths. The average control ow path ranges from 73 to 183 lines
of code, while the maximum is around 400 lines. Intra-procedural paths that
span 10-20 conditionals is not uncommon. For our purposes, FLASH protocol
implementation is a representative of low-level code that exists on a variety of
embedded systems. It is highly optimized, diÆcult to read, and thus diÆcult
to get correct. For the purpose of nding errors, FLASH was a hard test: by
the time we checked it had already undergone over ve years of testing under
simulation, on a real machine, and via manual formal verication [31].
2.2 Checking FLASH with static analysis
While FLASH code was diÆcult to reason about, it had the nice property that
many of the rules it had to obey mapped clearly to source code and thus were
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Rule Intuition LOC Bugs FP
\WAIT FOR DB FULL must come before
MISCBUS READ DB"
The synchronizing wait call is needed
to ensure the all the data has arrived.
12 4 1
\The has data parameter for message
sends must match the specied message
length (be one of LEN NODATA, LEN WORD,
or LEN CACHELINE)"
Message lengths and has data are de-
coupled to simplify hardware design.
29 18 2
\Message buers must be: allocated
before use, deallocated after, and not
used after deallocation."
Identical to memory semantics, except
there are limited numbers of buers.
94 9 25
\Message handlers can only send on
pre-specied `lanes"'
Deadlock prevention. 220 2 0
Total 355 33 28
Table 1
Representative FLASH rules, a simplistic intuitions for each, the number of lines of
code for a MC rule checker (LOC), the number of bugs the checker found (Bugs)
as well as the number of false positives (FP). We have elided other less useful
checkers; in total, they found one more bug at a cost of about 30 false positives.
readily checked with static analysis. The following rule is a representative
example. In the FLASH code, incoming message buers are read using the
macro MISCBUS READ DB. All reads must be preceded by a call to the macro
WAIT FOR DB FULL to synchronize the buer contents. To increase parallelism,
WAIT FOR DB FULL is only called along paths that require access to the buer
contents, and it is called as late as possible along these paths. This rule can
be checked statically by traversing all program paths until we either (1) hit a
call to WAIT FOR DB FULL (at which point we stop following that path) or (2)
hit a call to MISCBUS READ DB (at which point we emit an error). A checker
for this rule, written in metal can be found in Appendix A. In general the
static checkers roughly follow a similar pattern: they match on specic source
constructs and use a extensible state machine framework to ensure that the
matched constructs occur (or do not occur) in specic orders.
Table 1 gives a representative listing of the FLASH rules we checked. Since
the primary job of a FLASH node is to receive and respond to requests, most
rules involve correct message handling. Most errors were caused by failure
to deallocate message buers (9 errors) and by mis-specifying the length of a
message (18 errors). The other rules were not easier, but generally had less
locations where they had to be obeyed. There were 33 errors in total and 28
false positives. We obtained these numbers three years ago. Using our current
system would have reduced the false positive rate, since most were due to
simple infeasible paths, which our current system would eliminate. (However,
the severity of the errors made the given rate perfectly acceptable.)
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Invariants
The RealPtrs counter does not overow (RealPtrs maintains the number of sharers)
Only a single master copy of each cache line exists (basic coherence)
A node can never put itself on the sharing list (sharing list is only for remote nodes)
No outstanding requests on cache lines that are already in Exclusive state
Nodes do not send network messages to themselves
Nodes never overow their network queues
Nodes never overow their software queues (queue used to suspend handlers)
The protocol never tries to invalidate an exclusive line
Protocol can only put data into the processor's cache in response to a request
Table 2
Description of a representative subset of invariants checked in four FLASH
protocols using model checking. Checking these with static analysis would be
diÆcult.
2.3 Model checking FLASH
Our model checking approach used static analysis to reduce the work required
by automatically extract models from source code. We started the project
after noticing the close correspondence between a hand-written specication
of FLASH (from [31]) with the implementation code itself. FLASH code made
heavy use of stylized macros and naming conventions. These \latent speci-
cations" [15] made it relatively easy to pick out the code relevant to various
important operations (message sends, interactions with the I/O subsystem,
etc).
Model checking with our system involves the following four steps. First,
the user provides a metal extension that when run by our extensible compiler
marks specic source constructs, such as all message buer manipulations or
sends. These extensions are essentially abstraction functions. Second, the
system then automatically extracts a backward slice of the marked code, as
well as its dependencies. Third, the system translates the sliced code to a
Mur' model. Fourth, the Mur' model checker checks the generated model
along with a hand-written environment model.
Model checking allowed us to validate properties out of the reach of static
analysis. Table 2 lists a representative subset. Surprisingly, there were rela-
tively few errors in these properties as compared to the more shallow properties
checked with static analysis.
3 Lessons from FLASH
Outside the model checking community, the general perception is that since
model checking is \deeper" than static analysis then if you take the time to
model check code, you will nd more errors. We have not found this to be
true. In the FLASH case, static analysis found roughly four times as many
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bugs as model checking, despite the fact that we spent more time on the
model checking eort. Further, this dierential was after we aggressively tried
to increase bug counts. We were highly motivated to do so since we had
already published a paper that found 34 bugs (Chou et al [7]); publishing a
follow-on paper for a technique that found fewer was worrisome. In the end,
six of the eight bugs found with model checking had been found by static
analysis. Only two bugs were new | these were counter overows that were
deeper in the sense that it required a deep execution trace to nd them. While
they could potentially have been found with static analysis, doing so would
have required a special-case checker.
The main underlying reason for the lower bug counts is simple: model
checking requires running code, static analysis does not. This fact has impor-
tant implications. We discuss several below.
First, model checking requires a working model of the environment. Envi-
ronments are often messy and hard to specify. The formal model will simplify
it. There were ve main simplications that caused the model checker to miss
FLASH bugs found with static analysis:
(i) We did not model cache line data, though we did model the state that
cache lines were in, and the actual messages that were sent. This omission
both simplied the model and shrank the state space. The main impli-
cation in terms of nding errors was that there was nothing in the model
to ensure that the data buers used to send and receive cache lines were
allocated, deleted or synchronized correctly. As a result, model checking
missed 13 errors: all nine buer allocation errors and all four buer race
conditions.
(ii) We did not model the FLASH I/O subsystem, primarily because it was
so intricate. This caused the model checker to miss some of the message-
length errors found by the static checker.
(iii) We did not model uncached reads or writes. The node controllers sup-
port reads and writes that explicitly bypass the cache, going directly to
memory. These were used by rare paths in the operating system. Be-
cause these paths were rare it appears that testing left a relatively larger
number of errors on them as compared to more common paths. These
errors were found with static analysis but missed by the model checker
because of this model simplication.
(iv) We did not model message \lanes." To prevent deadlock, the real FLASH
machine divides the network into a number of virtual networks (\lanes").
Each dierent message type has an associated lane it should use. For
simplicity, our model assumed no such restrictions. As a result, we missed
the two deadlock errors found with static analysis.
(v) FLASH code has many dual code paths | one used to support simulation,
the other used when running on the actual FLASH hardware. Errors in
the simulation code were not detected since we only checked code that
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would actually run on the hardware.
Taking a broader view, the main source of false negatives is not incomplete
models, but the need to create a model at all. This must be done for each
new system to check and, given nite resources, the cost of doing so can
preclude checking new code or limit checking to just code or properties whose
environment can be specied with a minimum of fuss. In the case of FLASH,
time limitations caused us to skip checking the \sci" protocol, thereby missing
ve buer management errors (three serious, two minor).
Second, as with dynamic checking tools, model checking can only nd
errors on executed code paths. It turns out that in practice it is actually quite
diÆcult to exercise large amounts of code. In the case of the networking
code we describe in the next two sections, we execute around 50% of all
statements (not paths!), despite aggressive attempts to raise this count higher.
We do not have a good notion of how many paths we miss in FLASH, but an
uncontroversial guess would put it in the range of substantial to enormous.
Unchecked code has the unpleasant feature that it is silent | you receive
no warning when code is not exercised with the model checker. While we use
path coverage tools (i.e., static analysis) to partially detect this problem, these
tend to work at a very coarse-level | whether the code was ever executed,
rather than whether it was explored on all possible paths or with all \inter-
esting values." Additionally, detection is diagnostic rather than constructive.
Knowing that code is missed turns out to be a large step from knowing how
to drive the model checker to hit it. In contrast, static analysis can traverse
all program paths, nding errors on any of them. This is a crucial ability.
Static analysis: Push a button, check millions of lines of code.
The rst order limit on how many bugs you nd is the number of properties
you check times the number of times each property must be obeyed by code.
In practice, this calculation degenerates to how much code you check. In
this respect, static analysis has a clear advantage: it can check any code
that you can compile. It does not require executing code, thus does not
require an accurate model nor clever abstraction tricks. It can do all path
coverage automatically. It allows you to check the environment itself, rather
than abstracting it away. (Section 4 gives some quantitative measurements of
how much this matters.) Operationally, one of the most important eects is
that if code calls unresolved functions, you do not need to build a model or
even understand what functions do to make progress | simply skip them. As
a result, in our experience, it can easily be one to two orders of magnitude (in
time, eort, cleverness) to model check code.
A second feature is that since it is so easy to run over all paths in large code
bases, static analysis can gather large amounts of statistical information used
to automatically infer which properties to check [15]. More checked properties
equals more bugs. In contrast, model checking tends to be limited to a much
smaller number of dynamic code paths and hence a more limited window for
inference.
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3.1 Observed model checking advantages
Neither static analysis nor model checking are at the stage where one dom-
inates the other. We believe static analysis will generally win in terms of
nding as many bugs as possible. In this sense it is better, since less bugs gets
users closer to the desired goal of the absence of bugs (\total correctness").
However, model checking has two strengths that seem diÆcult to match.
First, since model checking executes the code, it can check properties not
easily visible to static inspection, in particular invariants over the data struc-
tures and values produced by code. Examples include the invariants that a
routing table does not have loops, that a tree is balanced, or (from FLASH)
that only a single master copy of each cache line exists. In contrast, static
analysis tends to work best at checking properties directly mirrored in the
source code itself, such as ensuring that function calls happen in specic or-
ders. In some sense, static analysis checks source code well, but checks the
implications of the source code relatively poorly. On the other hand, model
checking checks implications relatively better, but because of the problems
with abstraction and coverage, can be less eective checking the actual code
itself.
Second, model checking checks for actual errors, rather than having to
reason about all the dierent ways the error could be caused. If it catches
a particular error type it will do so no matter the cause of the error. For
example, a model checker that runs the code directly will detect all null pointer
dereferences, deadlocks, or any operation that causes a runtime exception since
the code will crash or lock up. Importantly, it will detect them without having
to understand and anticipate all the ways that these errors could arise. In
contrast, static analysis cannot do such end-to-end-checks, but must instead
look for specic ways of causing a given error. Errors caused by actions that
the checker does not know about or cannot analyze will not be agged. In
our case, we check many properties that are undecidable, and so minimize
false positives by looking for errors only in specic analyzable contexts. For
example, most of our analysis can detect errors that occur on a particular
code path, but are much weaker at nding errors that require heap analysis.
The robustness of model checking (or its depth) would be the main ability we
would like to take from it for our static analysis work.
4 Case study: AODV
This section describes our experiences nding bugs in the AODV routing pro-
tocol implementation using both model checking and static analysis. We rst
describe CMC, the custom model checker we built, give an overview of the
AODV protocol, and then compare the bugs found (and not found) by both
approaches.
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4.1 CMC Overview
The approach we used on the FLASH protocol had two problems. First, it
required the user to select and automatically mark stand-alone subparts of
a system. Doing so required an intimate understanding the checked system,
making it diÆcult to scale the approach to large systems. Second, Mur', like
most modeling languages lacks many C constructs such as pointers, dynamic
allocation, and bit operations. These omissions make translation diÆcult. Our
attempts in building a \generic" C to Mur' translator failed. Avoiding the
problem by abstracting the C features not supported in Mur' would severely
restrict the class of bugs that the model checker can nd.
We countered these problems by building CMC, a model checker that
checks programs written in C [29]. CMC was motivated by the observation
that there is no fundamental reason model checkers must use a weak input
language. As it executes the implementation code directly, it removes the
need to provide an abstract model, tremendously reducing the eort require
to model check a system. As the implementation captures all the behaviors of
the system, CMC is no longer restricted to behaviors that can be represented
in conventional modeling languages.
CMC is a Mur'-like tool for programs written in C or C++. It explores
the state space of a given system explicitly by storing states. The state of
a system is captured by its entire context: the global variables, heap, stack
and the machine registers. Each process in the model checked system can be
emulated by one or more threads. CMC schedules these threads to explore the
state space of the system. During model checking, CMC checks for a variety
of safety properties represented as boolean functions written in C.
As CMC deals with actual implementations and not their abstract mod-
els, it has to deal with much larger states and signicantly larger state spaces.
However, CMC is designed to be a bug-nding tool rather than a tool to check
for absolute correctness. By using approximate reduction techniques, CMC
is able to alleviate the state space explosion problem. CMC uses hashcom-
paction [36] to signicantly reduce the state space requirements at the cost of
a small risk of missing errors. Also, CMC employs various heuristics [29] to
automatically remove unnecessary variables from the state.
4.2 AODV Overview
AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector) protocol [10] is a loop-free rout-
ing protocol for ad-hoc networks. It is designed to work in an environment
of mobile nodes, withstanding a variety of network behaviors such as node
mobility, link failures and packet losses. AODV guarantees that the network
is free of routing loops at all instants. However, it is plausible that errors
in the protocol specication or its implementation can introduce loops in the
network. If any such routing loop appears in the network, the protocol has
no mechanisms to detect or recover from them. Thus, the loops persist for-
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Protocol Impl. Checked Correctness Environment State Canon-
Size Code Spec. network stubs -icalization
mad-hoc 7597 3336 301 400 100 165
Kernel AODV 7564 4508 301 400 266 179
AODV-UU 7208 5286 332 400 128 185
Table 3
Lines of implementation code vs. CMC modeling code.
Types of Checks Examples
Generic Assertions Segmentation violations, memory leaks, dangling pointers.
Routing Loop Invariant The routing tables of all nodes do not form a routing loop.
Routing Table Assertions At most one routing table entry per destination.
No route to self in the AODV-UU implementation.
The hop count of the route to self is 0, if present.
The hop count is either innity or less than the number of
nodes in the network.
Assertions on Message Fields All reserved elds are set to 0.
The hop count in the packet can not be innity.
Table 4
Properties checked in AODV.
ever, completely breaking the functioning of the protocol. As a consequence,
it is important that both the AODV protocol specication and any AODV
implementation be tested for loop freeness as thoroughly as possible.
AODV has a key property that greatly simplies the environment model.
The only input it needs from a user is a request for a route to a destination.
This can be easily modeled as a nondeterministic input that is enabled in
all states. Apart from this, an AODV node responds to two events, a timer
interrupt and a packet received from other AODV nodes in the network. Both
are straightforward to model.
4.3 Model Checking AODV with CMC
CMC checked three publicly available implementations of AODV: mad-hoc
(Version 1:0) [27], Kernel AODV (Version 1:5) [23], and AODV-UU (Ver-
sion 0:5) [16]. While it is not clear how well these implementations are tested,
they have been used in dierent testbeds and network simulation environ-
ments [28]. On average, the implementations contain 7500 lines of code.
For each implementation, the model consists of a core set of unmodied
les. This model executes along with an environment which consists of a
network model and simplied implementations (or \stubs") for the functions
not included in the model. Table 3 describes the model and environment
for these implementations. All three models reuse the same network model.
While performing this case study, CMC did not have the functionality to
automatically extract and canonicalize system states. The AODV models
11
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mad-hoc Kernel AODV AODV-UU
Mishandling malloc failures 4 6 2
Memory Leaks 5 3 0
Use after free 1 1 0
Invalid Routing Table Entry 0 0 1
Unexpected Message 2 0 0
Generating Invalid Packets 3 2 (2) 2
Program Assertion Failures 1 1 (1) 1
Routing Loops 2 3 (2) 2 (1)
Total 18 16 (5) 8 (1)
LOC per bug 185 285 661
Table 5
Number of bugs of each type in the three implementations of AODV. The gures
in parenthesis show the number of bugs that are instances of the same bug in the
mad-hoc implementation.
Bugs Found
by CMC by CMC by MC
& MC alone alone
Mishandling malloc failures 11 1 8
Generic Properties: Memory Leaks 8 - 5
Use after free 2 - -
Invalid Routing Table Entry - 1 -
Unexpected Message - 2 -
Protocol Specic: Generating Invalid Packets - 7 -
Program Assertion Failures - 3 -
Routing Loops - 7 -
Total 21 21 13
Table 6
Comparing MC and CMC. Note that for the MC results we only ran a set of
generic memory and pointer checkers rather than writing AODV-specic checkers.
Generating the MC results took less than two hours, rather than the weeks
required for the AODV results.
additionally include code to perform these functions.
As CMC was being developed during this case study, it is diÆcult to gauge
the time spent in building these models as opposed to building the model
checker itself. As a rough estimation, it took us two weeks to build the rst,
mad-hoc model. Building subsequent models was easier, and it took us one
more week to build both these models.
Table 4 describes the assertions CMC checked in the AODV implementa-
tions. CMC automatically checks certain generic assertions such as segmen-
tation violations. Additionally, the model contains an invariant to check if
the routing tables are loop free at all instants. Also, the model checks each
12
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message generated and routes inserted into the routing table for specic as-
sertions. Table 3 reects the lines of code required to add these correctness
properties.
CMC found a total of 42 errors. Of these, 35 are unique errors in the
implementations and one is an error in the underlying AODV specication.
Table 5 summarizes the set of bugs found. The Kernel AODV implementation
has 5 bugs (shown in parentheses in the table) that are instances of the same
bug in mad-hoc. The AODV specication bug causes a routing loop in all
three implementations.
4.4 Comparison with Static Analysis
We then used MC to check the AODV implementations for errors. MC checked
for generic errors such as memory leaks and invalid pointer accesses. The entire
process of checking the three implementations and analyzing the output for
errors took two hours. MC found a total of 34 bugs. We expect that if we
invested more eort in writing AODV-specic rules or in running additional
checkers that we would have found more errors.
Table 6 compares the bugs found by MC and CMC. It classies the bugs
found into two broad classes depending on the properties violated: generic
and protocol specic. In the class of generic errors, our results are similar to
the FLASH case study. MC found many more bugs than CMC. Except for
one, MC found all the bugs that CMC could nd.
The underlying reason is that MC checks all paths in all code that we can
compile. It does not require us to abstract away parts of the system, nor does it
require coming up with inputs to drive the system to execute a given code path.
In contrast, CMC can only execute code triggered by the specic environment
model. Of the 13 errors not found by CMC, 6 are in parts of the code that are
either not included in the model or stubbed out during environment modeling.
For instance, MC found two cases of mishandled malloc failures in multicast
routing code. All our CMC models omitted this code.
CMC missed more errors due to subtle mistakes in the environment model.
For example, the mad-hoc implementation uses a send datagram() function
to transmit a packet to the network. A memory leak in the implementation
is triggered only when this function fails. In our environment however, we
erroneously modeled the send datagram() function to always succeed. Thus,
CMC never detected this memory leak. CMC missed a total of 6 errors due
to such errors in the environment. MC found 1 more error in dead code that
can never be executed by any CMC model.
5
The one error that MC missed requires reasoning about the length of a
linked list. One function in the mad-hoc implementation assumes that the
input argument points to a linked list of a particular length. However, when
5
MC also found a null pointer violation in one of our models! We obviously do not count
this error.
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this linked list is allocated in another function, a malloc failure can cause the
list to be smaller than expected, leading to a null pointer violation. Present
static analyzers have diÆculty detecting such invariants of heap objects.
In the class of protocol-specic errors, CMC found 21 errors while MC
found none. Partly this was because it did not look for them. However, the
bulk of these errors would be diÆcult to catch using static analysis. Properties
such as routing loops involve invariants of objects across multiple processes.
Detecting such loops statically would require reasoning about the entire exe-
cution of the protocol, a diÆcult task.
Many properties are local to a process, but still diÆcult to detect statically
without generating many false positives. For instance, AODV-UU requires
that the routing table of a node does not contain a route to itself. This would
imply that the node has to route packets to a neighbor to reach itself. This
implementation inserts a route to the src-id eld in a received route response
message. However, there are no checks to ensure that the src-id received is not
the same as the current node identier. While a static analyzer could look for
such unchecked routing table insertions, it cannot determine which of these
are harmless. On a rst look it appears that src-id can never be the node
identier as no node sends a route response to itself. However, CMC found a
specic instance of the protocol (\gratuitous route response") in which such
a packet can be generated.
The results from this case study support the use of model checking tech-
niques to nd errors in systems. These results also suggest that in order for
model checkers to be eective and to justify the additional eort, they should
emphasize on properties that cannot be checked statically.
5 Case study: TCP
After our success with AODV, we decided to model check the Linux TCP
implementation. The key motivation behind this case study is to evaluate
the eectiveness of model checking large and well tested systems. The TCP
protocol is mature and the particular implementation we used (from the stable
2:4:19 release of the Linux kernel) is widely used in the Internet today. This
implementation contains approximately 50; 000 lines of code.
During the course of our case study, we realized that modeling the environ-
ment for a complex system is just hard. Section 5.1 describes the problems we
faced in modeling the environment for the Linux TCP implementation in the
context of our initial failed attempt. After spending months, we realized that
the only meaningful way to build an environment is to run the entire Linux
Kernel along with the TCP implementation in CMC. Section 5.2 describes
this approach.
A related problem is that a given environment model might restrict the
system behaviors explored by the model checker. As seen in our previous case
studies, these restrictions in the environment lead to missed errors. Section 5.3
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describes two coverage metrics we used to evaluate a particular environment
model, and Section 5.4 describes our eort in using these metrics to rene the
environment model. Finally, Section 5.5 presents our model checking results.
5.1 DiÆculties in Environment Modeling
All model checkers require that an appropriate model of the environment be
provided along with the system. While modeling the environment can be
trivial for a relatively small system, doing so for a large system like TCP is
not straightforward. Building an environment model requires the following
steps.
(i) Dening the System Boundary: The system to be model checked
is typically embedded with other modules in a larger execution context.
For instance, the TCP implementation executes in the Linux kernel. The
rst step involves dening a boundary between the system and its envi-
ronment. The modules within this boundary comprise the system.
(ii) Closing the System: The system is then closed by providing stubs for
all the interface functions in the system boundary. Additionally, a user
has to provide models of entities such as a network that interact with the
system.
(iii) Providing Environment Triggers: Once the environment is modeled,
a user determines the set of inputs the environment provides to the system
model. For each input, the user has to provide an appropriate guard
condition that determines when the particular input is enabled.
5.1.1 Failed Approach: The TCP Library Model
In our rst attempt, we followed an approach similar to the one that worked for
AODV: include a core set of modules in the system and abstract the remaining
modules in the environment. However, this approach failed to produce a
working model.
Dening the System Boundary: Following conventional wisdom, we
attempted to make the checked system as small as possible. Including addi-
tional modules into the system increases the system state, and can potentially
increase the state space. Starting from the core set of TCP modules, we con-
servatively added a few tightly coupled modules (such as IP) to simplify the
system boundary. Even then, the system boundary consisted of as many as
150 interface functions.
Closing the System: To close the system, we manually provided stub
implementations for all the interface functions in the system boundary. De-
spite our eorts to implement these stubs correctly, it was just impossible to
get them right.
Faulty stubs typically result in false behaviors that CMC will (falsely) ag
as errors in the checked code. These false positives can be very hard to debug
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and x. For instance, after days of debugging we found that a memory leak of
a socket structure was caused by incorrect stub implementation in the timer
model. The TCP implementation uses a function mod timer() to modify the
expiration time of a previously queued timer. This function's returns value
depends on whether the timer is pending when the function is called. Our
initial stub implementation did not capture this behavior. This incorrect stub
confused the reference counting mechanism of the socket structures leading
to a memory leak. (As TCP timers are members of the socket structure, a
queued timer amounts to an extra reference to the parent socket.)
Providing Environment Inputs: We also had trouble determining the
right guard conditions for certain inputs in the environment. For instance, a
user process can never get access to a partially connected TCP socket using the
standard system call interface. Modeling this required us to carefully disable
certain socket functions at dierent TCP states.
5.1.2 Hard Learned Lessons
All of the problems mentioned above arise because of our insuÆcient knowl-
edge of the dierent interfaces within the kernel. It is quite possible that after
suÆcient iterations of xing errors in the environment model, we would have
converged on a model that implemented all the interfaces accurately. However,
subsequent iterations involved bugs that were more subtle and took longer to
debug.
Thus it is essential that the system and the environment be split across
well-dened and documented boundaries. This greatly simplies the environ-
ment modeling. Also, as these boundaries are less likely to change in future
revisions, the same environment model can be reused as the system imple-
mentation evolves. While doing so might require the model checker to handle
larger states and state spaces, we believe the benets of a clean environment
model outweigh the increase in state sizes.
5.2 The Linux TCP Model
Expanding from the TCP module, the model can only be bounded by the
following two well-dened interfaces: the system call interface that denes
the interaction between user processes and the kernel, and the \hardware
abstraction layer" that denes the interaction between the kernel and the
architecture. Bounding the TCP module at these two interfaces includes the
entire kernel in our model.
To run the entire kernel in CMC, we had to \port" the kernel to CMC by
providing a suitable hardware abstraction layer. Our approach is very similar
to User Mode Linux (UML) [37].
Once the system boundary is clearly dened, dening the inputs and their
guard conditions is straightforward. Two user processes, one behaving as a
TCP server and the other as a TCP client trigger the TCP model by making
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Line Protocol Branching Additional
Description Coverage Coverage Factor Bugs
1 Standard server and client 47.4 % 64.7 % 2.91 2
2 Model 1 + simultaneous connect 51.0 % 66.7 % 3.67 0
3 Model 2 + partial close 52.7 % 79.5 % 3.89 2
4 Model 3 + message corruption 50.6 % 84.3 % 7.01 0
Combined Coverage 55.4 % 92.1 %
Table 7
Coverage achieved during model renement. The branching factor is a measure of
the state space size.
standard socket calls. The TCP model accesses the CMC network through
an appropriate network device driver. The environment nondeterministically
generates the clock interrupt to enable timers.
Apart from the generic errors that CMC automatically checks, we added
a few TCP specic assertions to our model. For instance, the model checks
if a packet generated by the implementation has a valid checksum. To check
the implementation for protocol compliance, the model simultaneously runs
a TCP reference model along with the implementation. The reference model
performs the basic state machine transitions described in [34]. The model
provides the same inputs to both the implementation and the reference model,
and checks if their states are consistent. CMC reports any inconsistency as a
protocol violation error.
5.3 Measuring the Search Eectiveness
Even after a working environment model is built, one problem still remains:
the environment at hand might not trigger all the behaviors in the system. The
TCP protocol is complex and includes many functionalities that are enabled
by various conguration variables and socket options. While enabling more
inputs can potentially trigger more behaviors in the system, doing so can
drastically increase the state space. This clearly indicates a need for search
eectiveness metrics by which dierent environment models can be evaluated.
As CMC almost never completes the state space search, such an eectiveness
measure can also indicate how well a particular system is tested.
We used two ways to measure the eectiveness of the search. The rst
measure is the line coverage achieved during model checking. While this mea-
sure need not correspond to how well the system has been tested, it is helpful
in detecting the parts that are not tested.
The second measure, which we call \protocol coverage," corresponds to the
behaviors of the protocol tested by the model checker. We calculate protocol
coverage as the line coverage achieved in the TCP reference model mentioned
above. This roughly represents the degree to which the protocol transitions
have been explored.
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5.4 Iterative Environment Renement
We used the metrics discussed in the previous section to iteratively rene the
model to explore more system behaviors. In many instances, low coverage
helped in pointing out errors in our environment model.
Table 7 describes the coverage achieved during the model renement pro-
cess. For a particular model, we measured coverage cumulatively using three
search techniques: breadth-rst, depth-rst, and random. In random search,
each generated state is given a random priority. Table 7 also reports the
branching factor of the state space as a measure of its size. For the rst three
models the branching factor is calculated from the number of states in the
queue at depth 10 during a breadth rst search. For the fourth model, CMC
ran out of resources at depth 8, and the branching factor is calculated at this
depth.
The rst model consists of a TCP client communicating with a TCP server.
Once the connection is established, the client and server exchange data in both
directions before closing the connection. This standard model discovered two
protocol compliance bugs in the TCP implementation.
Starting from this model, we iteratively rened the model by manually in-
specting the line coverage and protocol coverage to determine the behavior we
wanted to include next. In the second model, the server nondeterministically
decides to actively initiate a connection. This enables additional transitions
in the protocol that handle simultaneous connection of two TCP peers. In
the third model, both the client and the server nondeterministically decide to
close a connection during data transfer. This improved the protocol coverage
and resulted in the discovery of two more errors.
Still, the environment did not allow enough \bad" behavior. As an attempt
to generate \random" packets, we nondeterministically toggled certain key
control ags in the TCP packet. These corrupted packets triggered a lot
of error recovery code in the implementation. But they also resulted in an
enormous increase in the state space.
Tweaking the environment the right way to achieve a more eective search
still remains an interesting but unsolved problem. Also, it is not clear how
much of this renement process can be automated.
5.5 TCP Model Checking Results
We have detected four errors in the Linux TCP implementation. All are
instances where the implementation fails to meet the TCP specication. These
errors are fairly complex and require an intricate sequence of events to trigger
the error.
The following is a brief description of two of the bugs CMC found. While
a detailed understanding of the TCP protocol [34] is required to completely
understand these bugs, the purpose of the description below is to provide a
general avor of errors CMC is able to nd.
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Model Closing the System Environment Triggers Correctness Spec.
lines of code time lines of code time lines of code time
AODV 568 1 week 400 1 week 311 1 day
TCP library 3406 1.5 months 806 2 days 50 1 day
TCP with UML 6583 3 weeks 1415 2 weeks 718 3 days
Table 8
Eort required for modeling the environment, in terms of the lines of code
required and the time taken. The time reported here is approximate and is only
intended to show the relative eort required. Also for the TCP with UML Linux
model, we closed the system by modifying the UML code. We counted the number
of lines in all the les in which at least one modication was made.
The rst bug involves the processing of RST (reset) packets. A RST packet
is used to indicate an abnormal close of a connection. In response to a RST
packet, a TCP implementation is required to free any resources used by the
connection and gracefully inform the application. However, in the SYN RCVD
state, the Linux TCP implementation fails to process certain RST packets.
Specically, a RST packet without the ACK bit set will be ignored. This
results in unnecessary lockup of kernel resources.
The second bug involves an inappropriate handling of the ACK eld in a
packet. An ACK acknowledges the reliable transfer of a data segment to the
sender. Also, specic ACKs indicate an opportunity for the sender to increase
its congestion window and send more data. However, using wrong ACKs for
this purpose can result in a decrease in the data transfer performance. CMC
found an instance where the implementation used a duplicate ACK packet to
increase its congestion window. The specication requires that such duplicate
packets be ignored.
5.6 Lessons from Model Checking TCP
This section summarizes some key lessons we learned during our TCP model
checking eort.
(i) No model is as good as the implementation itself. Any modication,
translation, approximation done is a potential for producing false posi-
tives, danger of checking far less system behaviors, and of course missing
critical errors.
(ii) Any manual work required in the model checking process becomes im-
mensely diÆcult as the scale of the system increases. In order to scale,
model checker should require as little user input, annotations and guid-
ance as possible.
(iii) If an unit-test framework is not available, then dene the system bound-
ary only along well-known, public interfaces.
(iv) Try to cover as much as possible: the more code you trigger, the more
bugs you nd, and more useful model checking is.
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Model checking currently requires spending a lot of eort on designing the
environment. Table 8 gives crude measurements of the environment modeling
eort for TCP and AODV. Most of this eort can be eliminated if the system
is designed for unit testing, as much of the work needed to unit test code is
identical to that needed to build an environment model. Unfortunately, this
is not the case with most systems we encounter.
One way to mitigate the environment modeling eort is to provide model
checking compatible standard libraries. As many software systems use the
same libraries, the eort involved can be amortized over many model checking
projects. Providing tools to automate the environment modeling process is an
interesting area of future research.
6 General Lessons
6.1 Myth: model checking = no false positives
A common claim, at least among static analysis researchers is that model
checkers do not suer from false positives. They most certainly do. In several
of our projects, the majority of the errors found during development were false
positives, primarily due to under-constrained or misspecied environments and
\harness" code. In a real system, there will be huge numbers of interfaces with
typically non-obvious or at least rich semantics. At some point a line has to
be drawn and these interfaces faked so that the model checker can work on a
subset of the system. However, it is easy to get such functions slightly wrong.
Since the point of model checking is to nd corner cases, it will persistently
root out misunderstandings in environmental interfaces. These mistakes can
take several days to track down, since they often just lead to the model-checked
code crashing. The answer to the question \is it a bug in the code or in our
model?" comes down on the latter irritatingly often. It is hard to overestimate
the diÆculty in correctly modeling the parts of the system you attempt to cut
out.
6.2 Ease-of-inspection really matters
A surprise for us from our static analysis work was just how important ease-
of-inspection is. Errors that are too hard to inspect might as well not be
agged since the user will ignore them (and, for good measure, may ignore
other errors on general principle). For example, the commercial PREx tool
explicitly avoided nding race conditions and deadlocks simply because the
errors were too diÆcult to inspect [33]. Our initial commercial eorts have
similarly scaled back on analysis sophistication to focus on errors that were
easy to reason about. Given two bugs, one easy to examine and one hard, then
in the absence of additional discriminatory information (severity, likelihood)
the rst is better.
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6.3 Myth: more analysis is always better
We, like many others in the eld, initially believed that more analysis was
always better then less, whether it came in the form of model checking, sim-
ulation, or deeper static analysis. This view was simplistic: adding more
analysis does not always improve results and can even make them worse. The
ideal error is easy to diagnosis, is a true error, and is easy to x. Generally
speaking, the more analysis required to nd an error the worse it is on all
three of these metrics:
(i) Typically, the more analysis used to nd an error, the harder the error is
to reason about. During inspection, the user must mentally emulate each
analysis step (how aliases were determined, whether an interprocedural
call path is feasible, etc) to determine how plausible they are and how
they can be countered. The more steps the more work this emulation
becomes.
(ii) As the number of analysis steps increases, so does the chance that one of
them went wrong. If there is no analysis, then there can be no approx-
imation mistakes. The more analysis there is, the more widespread the
eects of a mistake.
(iii) Hard errors to nd are often hard errors to x.
As an example, our initial static checkers were almost syntactic [14]. As a
result, the errors they found were almost certainly errors and were trivial
to inspect. As we added more interprocedural support, errors became more
diÆcult to inspect. In fact, we often deliberately reverted to much weaker
analysis to nd errors than our system supports, simply because specializing
to these error classes cherry picks easy-to-diagnose bugs. The most common
case is that we often design checkers explicitly to use intraprocedural analysis
despite the fact that our system supports transparent interprocedural analysis:
Local bugs are much easier to diagnose than interprocedural ones. Even if we
do use strong analysis, we almost always rank error reports based on the
number of analysis steps required. For example, bugs involving aliasing or
spanning procedure calls are demoted below those that do not.
6.4 Myth: all bugs matter
We initially thought that all bugs matter and all bugs will be xed. This
is not true. If you nd a small number of bugs, people will x them all. If
you nd thousands, they will not. We have observed this both with open
source projects and with commercial systems | many of the bugs we have
detected are still open. Prior to our work, the PREx group observed a similar
dynamic: giving someone a stack of 1,000 defects is an eective way to elicit
a blank stare and then the question \that's great, but which ones matter?"
Its not enough to nd a lot of bugs. As tools become more eective, this
will become more obvious. What users really want is to nd the 5-10 bugs that
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\really matter" | e.g., the ones that will hurt a large number of customers,
absorb the bulk of debugging time, etc. A general, not-unreasonable belief is
that bugs will follow a 90-10 distribution. Thus, out of 1000 errors, 100 will
account for most of the pain and 900 will be a waste of resources to x. In fact,
xing these 900 errors may worsen system quality by introducing additional
errors or draining resources from other eorts (testing, code reviews). Unfor-
tunately, while current tools can easily segregate errors into dierent types
that can be inspected by priority (security holes before storage leaks before
null pointer dereferences) they lack eective methods for identifying the \most
important" errors. Identifying these would be a good area of future research.
7 Related Work
This paper discusses our experiences in using two approaches to nd errors in
systems: static analysis and model checking. While the benets and diÆculties
of these two approaches are individually well understood, to our knowledge
this is the rst paper to compare the two approaches and evaluate them with
respect to the eort involved and the results produced on dierent sets of
properties.
The area of using static analysis for bug nding has become extremely ac-
tive. Some of the more well-known tools include include PREx (mentioned
above), ESP [11], ESC [17,25], the Warlock race detector [35], and Wagner's
security work [39,38]. Others have gone towards more language-based ap-
proach, such as Vault [12] and Foster et al [18]. Or CCured [30], a hybrid
static-dynamic tool for detecting memory errors that uses a type inference
algorithm to eliminate the need for many dynamic checks. Finally, the SLAM
project combines aspects of both static analysis and model checking [1,2].
Many verication tools statically extract an abstract model for a given
system. Bandera [9] is a sophisticated model extractor for Java programs. It
uses a given temporal property as a slicing criteria to extract relevant parts of
the system. Also, Bandera accepts user provided annotations to abstract data
values to specic subranges. FeaVer [21] uses a set of user dened mappings
to extract abstract models from C code. These models are checked using the
SPIN model checker.
Two prior verication tools have used the idea of directly model checking
the implementation. Verisoft [19] executes C programs and has been success-
fully used to check communication protocols [5]. Java PathFinder [3] consists
of a modied Java virtual machine that can check concurrent Java programs.
The diÆculties of environment modeling have been discussed before both in
the context of Verisoft [8] and Java PathFinder [32].
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8 Conclusion
This paper has described tradeos between both static analysis and model
checking, as well as some of the surprises we encountered while applying model
checking to large software systems.
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A Checker Example
Figure A.1 provides an example of a metal checker. This checker checks for
the rule \WAIT FOR DB FULL must come before MISCBUS READ DB." Checkers
are built of variable declarations, states, patterns that can match in the state,
and arbitrary actions written in C code that perform operations when their
transition occurs (allowing them to check more than nite state properties).
The checker declares two variables, addr and buf as wildcard variables that
will pattern match any C expression (any expr). The remainder of the checker
denes a simple state machine with a single state, start. SMs start execution
in the rst state they dene (in this case start). From its start state, the
SM uses two patterns to search for all uses of the macros WAIT FOR DB FULL
and MISCBUS READ DB. When either matches, the scalar expression passed as
their arguments will be placed in addr and, for MISCBUS READ DB, buf. The
matching rule will then cause the SM to transition to the (optional) state (the
token after the ==> operator) and then execute the (optional) action. If a
rule's state is omitted, the SM remains in the current state. The start state
has two rules. If the rst rule's pattern for WAIT FOR DB FULL matches, then
the handler has correctly waited for its data buer to ll, and any subsequent
read on this execution path will be valid. Thus, the checker transitions to the
stop state, which causes it to stop running on the current path. If the second
rule's pattern matches, then the execution path being checked did not wait for
its buer to ll and it had a buer race condition error. This rule's associated
action will then print out an error message. Since the rule does not give a
transition state, the checker will remain in the start state to catch further
violations along the path.
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sm wait_for_db {
// Declare two variables 'addr' and 'buf' that can
// match any expression. */
decl any_expr addr, buf;
// The checker begins in the first state (here 'start').
// This state searches for two patterns conjoined
// with the '|' operator. */
start:
// The handler is allowed to read the data buffer
// after calling 'WAIT_FOR_DB_FULL' --- once the
// pattern below matches, we transition to the
// 'stop' state, which stops checking on this
// path.
{ WAIT_FOR_DB_FULL(addr); } ==> stop
// If we hit a read of the data buffer in this
// state, the handler did not do a WAIT_FOR_DB_FULL
// first so emit an error and continue checking. */
| { MISCBUS_READ_DB(addr, buf); } ==>
{ err("Buffer not synchronized"); }
;
}
Fig. A.1. A simpliedmetal checker to nd violations of the rule \WAIT FOR DB FULL
must come before MISCBUS READ DB." It searches FLASH code looking for any data
buer read (using MISCBUS READ DB) not preceded by a synchronizing wait call
(using WAIT FOR DB FULL).
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